

John Hyland: 1. EE/ONE (Eastern Europe; 55) 5 June

1. xka

1. Initial attitudes in CIA estimate, 10-17 Oct.
2. Reaction when told.
3. Interplay with MCC (MCC certainty; theory; a nut; Kusk reaction)
4. Memo over weekend; Kent attitude.
5. Kowler interview: acted as if didn't know.
6. Turkey: our basic strategic territory, long before missiles put there; in Cuba, SU making free of "our" territory (what if they had created base, waited couple of years; eased in with subs, etc.)
7. Attitude to news of 11-20's; feeling that SU was "testing," faster than expected.
8. SNIE actually drafted last week in Aug (sure SAMs there).
xx MCC rejected Cuban group SNIE, brought in EE to consider military buildup, possibility of missiles.
9. MCC attitude; wrong guesses.
10. Theories of Sov calculation: 1) now accepting big risk; ~~xxxxxx~~
2) underestimating risk; 3) Hyland: desperation, severely pressed by need for improvement (last chance), led to wiseful underestimation of risk; 4) (my?) risk not underestimated; but badly played by K, good circumstances for US, good playing by US;
11. Estimates played small role; discredited; worked mainly for MCC, didn't influence him much; Pres relied on non-intell advisors and MCC for predictions, didn't look to Estimates for predictions, analysis.
12. MCC desire to bomb, hawk (eagle); but, prediction (early) of strong SU reaction (bomb Thule/ Berlin, SEAsia, Turkey, Iran) to attack, especially if any Russian soldiers killed; thought gov should prepare.
13. K interview with Gandhi; fake mobilization, deployment, alert. question whether war would have followed.
14. No question put to ONE on effect of action/preparation/ultimatum (though Memo to MCC, early, on ultimatum--instead of blockade; thought this would only lead to counterpressure by SUQ. No tendency to initiate such an estimate. If asked, would probably not have believed in brilliantly effective style of handling.
15. Sovs surprised (Zorin reaction; failure to hedge at all, e.g., to install SAMs before letting us see missiles). Effectiveness of our secrecy; due to what? Very bad "crisis management" by Sovs.
16. Process; special group in ONE; work on estimates; work for MCC;
17. Process of producing SNIE, NIE (proposal accepted by Kent; draft; considered by Board; Board member chairman of est, intell comm representatives (e.g., Sohn) and solicited, conference; USIA
18. Question of asking, in SNIE: 1) But suppose he got away with it, what would it be worth? 2) What would it take for him to get away with it; What might keep us from attacking? (He should have anticipated threats, deployment, etc; should have hedged more against possibility)

John Whitman:

1. Process: ONE, BNE, USIB ; amount of coordination; role of DCI.
2. Unprecedented: Rostow panel, assignment of Whitman, sharp split between X DCI and ONE (roles of Harris, Hitchcock; Tidwell?)
3. Issues on SWIB: likelihood of Sov military response; relative likelihood of strong response to invasion, limited military attack.
4. Feeling by 22 Oct on likely Sov response to limited, controlled US response. reaction to blockade proposal.
5. W. reaction to news (told, "MCC was right") ; prior commitment to position because of MCC prodding of Kent.
6. Fear of effect on MCC/ONE.
7. Do analysts get timely, comprehensive info on private, verbal messages to Su? (what knowabout F-S). Do they ask, what tacit info is our whole posture and pattern of behavior and statements affecting opponent's expectations?
- 8.

The U-2 and the Crisis

1. What was the relative importance of the roles of the photos in:
 - a) Convincing intelligence analysts?
 - b) Convincing top Presidential advisors?
 - c) Convincing the President?
 - d) Catching the attention of advisors, President?
 - e) Earlier, supporting negative beliefs as to missiles?
 - f) Establishing the relative credibility of various informants?
 - g) Establishing the need for further information?
 - h) Convincing Congress; the press; the public; allies; Soviets; UN.

(Note problem: earlier unsuitability of photographic evidence to convince these critics that missiles were not there; as in Missile Gap crisis.)

(Note McNamara's attempt to use photos in this role, after all, to show that missiles had left; but note the costs of such comprehensive revelations, and limited positive effects).

2. Photos, as information available to a limited group and not outside, create a "data differential" between that group and others including not only the public but the staff of the "elite." This may be reflected in a systematic difference of opinion (e.g., if "outside" group has access to, or is locked, a part of the information available to elite, e.g., collateral reports or corresponding journalistic sources: Keating), where "elite" is unable to reveal that it has additional information, or what it is. Thus, the difference appears to the critic and to observers as revealing simply a difference in interpretation of the same data, revealing in turn a difference in preconceptions or goals. The photos (or other elite sources) may either negate the other evidence--as prior to Aug. 29, 62 (or to during 1958-60)--or suggest a different interpretation--as between Aug 29 and Oct 14 (S/As)--or reinforce the other evidence--as after Oct 14. In the first case, the Administration will seem lethargic, inattentive, wishfully negligent, or bound by the inertia of preconceptions, etc--particularly to those who do have access to the opposing data and thus have a claim to be recognized by public as "informed experts" (note legacy of Gaither Committee, particularly during 1958-60; general position of Congressional critics and non-profit "experts"). There is, in fact, often enough a basis for this charge, and it is difficult for the public to distinguish those cases in which this is not so (especially because security relating to the special information is often kept unusually well).

In latter two cases, Gov may be tempted to release photost to support its case; but if it does not, it can now appear reckless, wishful, too ready to jump to conclusions on insubstantial evidence; fears as ~~its~~ to its probable future "false alarm rate" may arise, and precautionary measures taken by Allies and opponents.

To guard the source of its special information, elite may even be forced to take actions counter-indicating their possession of it. (This may arise when the data-differential refers to the existence of detailed plans or covert objectives. Note Nixon dilemma when JFK proposed aiding invasion of Cuba; the dilemma when Stevenson proposed stopping tests?

What if the U-2 photos...

3. Different impact of negative and positive results from photos. Distinguish between photos that negate other evidence--as when photos show definitely that there are no missiles on a particular site, contrary to specific reports--and photos that fail to confirm other evidence or to point in the same direction--as when photos failed to show that missiles were being dismantled, or showed conflicting indications.

Is it generally true that negative evidence from photos, or even failure to confirm other evidence, is given more weight at high levels than at lower levels of analysis, or more weight than it should get? Or, are there circumstances in which this occurs?

Even where the photos strongly negate some specific hypothesis of interest, there may be other specific hypotheses, or broader hypotheses, almost as plausible a priori, which these photos simply fail to confirm (or even support). Proponents of the earlier, discredited hypotheses will be motivated to generate such alternatives: less hurt by this specific evidence, and perhaps less vulnerable to this form of test. This motivation may discredit the search operation; yet the hypotheses it turns up may be worthy of consideration.

E.g.; a) Should the Administration have been as confident as it was (?) in the adequacy of U-2 coverage prior to May, 1960? What does Cuba affair tell us about this? How about IREM/IREMs?

b) How much confidence can be placed in photo evidence that all missiles were removed from Cuba?

c

Can there be "hard" evidence of a negative nature, except as relating to a highly specific hypothesis? Are photos that fail to show certain phenomena treated as being as "hard" as if they distinctly showed other phenomena?

(See also the last section on the same topic)

1. How explain that missiles were transported clandestinely, but not constructed covertly?

2. How does installation and operation of SAMs in Cuba compare with practice elsewhere when SAMs have been deployed? With Soviet practice?
Have they ever activated SAMs piecemeal?

3. What Was Sept. 10 flight cancelled because of Chinat shootdown?

4. What if Aug. 30 and Sept 8 U-2 incidents had occurred prior to Aug. 29;

a) Would SAMs have been discovered so early?

b) In absence of flights, might collateral reports have caused more concern?
e.g., in absence of evidence on SAMs, suggesting alternative explanation?

5. Is absence of recon, because of incidents or weather, reflected in planning or declaratory activity? (Or are planning activities geared to the expectation that recon will continue or proceed soon, with no adjustment for unexpected delays?)

6. Is there a tendency to react to information-flow as if it closely corresponded to flow of events being observed? E.g., to react to sudden exposure to data as if external events had moved rapidly (e.g., increase of info on missiles between 16 and 18 Oct ~~xxxxif~~ because of increase in coverage; tendency to treat as if revealing crash activity? Sudden increases in identification of activities not previously covered or recognized; does this create crisis atmosphere? e.g., SA-2s after 29 Aug.; SA-2s in East Germany and SU)

Or does lack of newly confirming evidence create atmosphere that "nothing new is happening," even though lack may reflect absence of recon for weather or other reasons. Or, "something may be happening but there is no 'hard' evidence of it." E.g., Admin statements about missiles in period 5 Sept--14 Oct; or intell. statements about dismantling, 30 Oct--2 Nov.

7x

7. Who knew of emergence of SAM system on 26-27 Oct in US? How was it interpreted, at the time? Who analysed it for ExComm?

8. How might this have been related to shootdown of U-2 on 27 Oct? When, in what sequence, did news of this come in? How was it interpreted, in various stages, by various people?

9. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from high-alt photography possible?

10. Is there reason to believe that missiles did not come on ship prior to mid-Sept?

11. With what other Sov operations can this deployment be compared? What are differences, similarities: e.g., in secrecy, concurrency, site preparation, C&C, security, timing, manning? How much intelligence did we get out of it? Was this foreseeable by Sovs? (Was this reason for predicting Sovs wouldn't put base here?)

Southard: 21 April

Fomin told Scali, Sat morning (27 Oct) that K had not received reply from State before sending Sat. morning letter on Turkey-Cuba. This was blatantly untrue; Fomin got reply about 7:30-8 Friday night, must have sent it immediately, K would have had it about 12 hours before broadcast of Turkey letter.

((But: Might Fomin know of a foulup in comm, or or delay in transmitting to K at other end? Consider delays in Moscow--Washington. Might K have been unavailable? What was means of transmission from Russian Embassy in Washington? How does Hot Line change this?))

((Who knew of Scali deal Friday night: before ExComm meeting? Was ExComm told? Who knew by Saturday-Sunday? Did some see the Friday night letter without knowing of Scali; how did they interpret it? Who knew on Saturday that there had been a Friday night answer to Scali; in effect, an answer to the Friday night letter?

What were beliefs of Ex Comm, President, as to whether K had received reply to Scali before sending Turkey letter?

Were other channels being used simultaneously: Dobrynin-RK, Dobrynin--Thompson, Kohler-Gromyko? (Pachter). Were British in circuit? Friday night? Saturday?

S. believes: K got Scali reply Friday night, and this reassured him that US, interested in negotiating this deal, was unlikely to take violent action immediately; K had time to try Turkey deal.

((But how about Scali emphasis on "little time"?))

Question then becomes: What changed his mind 24 hours after Turkey letter?

S. answer: the "signal of utmost alarm." (See Pachter)

((Were there other channels as well?

Was threat specific? Did it unequivocally go beyond increasing the blockade? Was it regarded by JFK as absolute commitment? What did he foresee as possible, probable responses? When exactly was it sent? Relation to concern over retaliation against Turkey?

Is it possible there was direct answer Saturday night? Might retal. against Turkey ever have been specifically threatened? (S. thinks not).

Why didn't K use more of period allowed? (Analogy: immediate turning back of snips after speech?)

((Why is signal held so tightly? Why are all private comms held quite so tightly? Has there been bad past experience on this?

S. had not considered possibility that U-2 shootdown, if accident, might have frightened K. (Note Pachter: according to RK, it did determine JFK to increase recon and blockade. And...?)

((How would "signal" of dismantling Turk missiles have appeared in combination with this? Would this be considered?

Who on ExComm, others, knew of Signal?

...with assumption that ~~surrounding~~ the public
...
...
...
((Certainly kept it statements and Grogg's statements also in
describing the role of the Sov "specialists"--and hence were
extremely misleading.))

But S is now convinced that they were directly deceptive.
((Does Dobrynin-Sorenson talk completely confirm this?))

S. Study started with a directive from McC to analyse what it
was ((not, whether?)) that we had done that had led ~~in~~ K to believe
that he could get away with it.

Rostow criticised that study emphasized what we had done rather
than the pressures on K to do what he did (S thinks R. could not have
read appendix, which goes into this); but S thinks that former is
more pertinent to examine, from point of view of learning from
experience. ((? May be misleading.))

Rostow points to his memo of Aug '62, pointing to pressures on
K, and possibility that they might lead him to: 1) improve
strategic balance; 2) put pressure on Berlin; or 3) increase Cuba
as militant base. But 1 and 3 did not lead Rostow to predict
missiles in Cuba; rather, his paper indicated building up Cuba as
a base for subversion.

Question is: do even the combination of pressures and reassuring
signals add up to a strong explanation of K action? I.e., granted
that they make K action more probable than if they did not apply,
do they make it highly probable, or more probable than not? ((and
how do they weigh against the unreassuring signals, the disincentives
: and the ~~inner~~ inertia of past Sov patterns?)) Note that both
signals and incentives were known to us well before fall of 1962;
why did they not lead to prediction of missiles? Should they have?

((It is a plausible hypothesis that int. comm. is inhibited from
taking "reassuring signals" fully, explicitly, or realistically into
account, either consciously or in published results.))

S. thinks that if he had been estimating on Cuba, he too would
have predicted against missiles: possible but unlikely; because it
would be irrational of Sovs to do it. ((Why? Is that still clear?))

Thus; his "explanation" still leaves action unlikely; he is forced
to regard it as "irrational": impulsive, erratic, wishful, reckless.

((S. tends to emphasize: K probably gave more weight, wishfully,
to reassuring signals than he should. He doesn't consider as much
that K may have given more weight to incentives--considered situation
more urgent, alternatives worse--than he "should." How about "last
change" aspect? How about effect of recent improvement in balance?))

Concept and execution clearly indicate that Sov authorities made no appreciable effort to prevent or delay US detection by aerial recon during the deployment phase. /of the offensive wea.
It is believed that the most likely explanation is that they judged the risk of a US military reaction to be very slight.

((Mandelstam: they had camouflage nets with them--this degree of preparation--but didn't use them till late in October (date?); first camouflage in response to low-level flights on 23 Oct was natural cover (M. guessed a failure by local commander to carry out camouflage plan; or perhaps nets were not loaded correctly, etc. One analyst told him nets would have delayed recognition a couple of weeks. Infrared gear was not being used, though available (?).))

((Did Sovs believe it possible to prevent detection? Report says would have been difficult to conceal IRBM sites; though could have delayed starting these.))

Concurrency: Sov concept obviously did not envision the initial establishment of an island defense in order to test US reaction and screen the subsequent introduction of strat missile forces.

((So McC guess was wrong in reasoning, though right in conclusion. But does failure to use SA-2's against U-2's indicate indifference? Would Sovs have been willing to shoot down a U-2? Report doesn't comment.

SA-2's could have been more deterrent if they had activated radars. Or would they? They were deterrent, weren't they; overflights did cease for over a month. (Were SA's a factor?) Might this have been hoped by Sovs? (presumably not, given failure to activate).))

In (In concluding that Sovs regarded risk as low, failure to use SA-2's is one ground; another, no apparent effort to minimize time during which some MRBM units were detectable before all of the MRBM units were operational--but would this be critical to US reaction, once some units were operational?

Third: failure to camouflage.

The conclusion seems inescapable that the Sov authorities () chose to ignore the distinct possibility of US overflights in planning the Cuban operation. This choice seems inexplicable unless the Soviet leaders judged with considerable assurance that the US would acquiesce in the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba--or at least that the US would not attempt to force their removal by reacting militarily--and hence that the possibility of US detection was not critical to the success or failure of the venture.

((But: no mention of the fact that this was not a departure from familiar pattern, but a reproduction of standard procedure in SU: careful ground screening, deceptive public statements and private statements, covered movements, but open to air recon; it does not have to be explained on ad hoc basis (this is to ignore organizational/procedural inertia, compartmentalization, lack of adaptation). Also, little attention to measures that were taken to cover and deceive; SU grounds for pessimism as to success; and alerts (discounted).

(Myth of Mandelstam? Of course, planning, execution, adaptation, etc. are adaptation?)
But the high level of Soviet military and political decision-making?

2.

Possibility considered that actual planners were unaware of or grossly underestimated US recon capabilities; seems unlikely. But reasons for dismissing are U-2 trial, and Sov recognition there of U. capabilities; and fact that Chief of Air Defense at that time became Chief of SRF. Can this be dismissed?

(Rules of the game): Having lived restively under the shadow of US strategic bases for more than a decade, the Sov leaders have probably come to regard them, particularly in the age of the ICBM, as a disquieting but not major phenomenon of great power relations. Castro's Cuba provided K with his first opportunity to establish an overseas military base. He may have felt confident that the US would understand the rules as he did--that military bases on the opponent's periphery are facts of great power life which fall far short of a provocation to war.

((If so, he failed to see asymmetry of power as a rule of the game; or was ready to change it, in which case he could have foreseen resistance, or possibility that US hadn't noticed it was time for a change.

Or: is it possible that bases really weren't as salient for SU, by now, as for US; i.e., that Turkey no longer "provokes" them to extent that Cuba does us? Is it possible he really underestimated: a) the degree to which this move would provoke us, or irritate us--aside from the likelihood of US response; b) the gains to him--or losses to us--which, in our judgment, he would have achieved if we had acquiesced? i.e., that one reason he judged likelihood of response as low is that he underestimated degree of motivation.))

Objectives:

Strategic change produced by Cuba would have been short-lived, given planned increases in US ICBM and Polaris deployment in 1963; reason for expecting success to be followed by attempt to achieve dramatic victory elsewhere, Berlin.

((Berlin 1962 was thus an Averted Crisis. Cuba 1962 is an example of a crisis in which Sov victory would have consisted precisely in establishing a base for a substantive victory in a subsequent crisis, or phase.

Les Crises en Chaine. (or: The Century of Crisis.)

Noise and Inference:

More than 200 reports refer to presence on Cuba of missiles before Jan 62. Numerous reports refer to construction activity and equipment observed during spring of 1962 in areas where SAM sites were located later; however, photography failed to reveal any such activity or equipment. But strong possibility that this reporting reflected influx into Cuba, beginning in early 1962, of Sov personnel (and vehicles?) somehow connected with the buildup beginning physically in late July.

((Hypothesis: A common pattern, like that in Cuba: 1) forerunners of later threat--perhaps personnel, rumors, phenomena not observable by air recon--give rise to exaggerated agent reports of observable activity; 2) photos disprove presence of such activity, and tend to discredit totally, or excessively (?) the agent reports; so that (3) later reports, based on firmer grounds, find preconceptions hardened against them, and reduced/delayed tendency even to accept risks and costs of checking them by further recon (note suspension of flights); especially if (4) photos do turn up phenomena that serves as alternative explanation for reports.

Typ II: Negative results from photos have--unjustifiably--a strong effect on expectations comparable to that of positive results; and have excessive weight in undermining positive agent reports.

3.

((Hyp II follows automatically if it is the case (Mandelstam) that top decision-makers (Ike?) really look seriously only at photos, SI, dismiss agent reports; then negative results from former are essentially the only evidence considered.

Task: analyze timing and content of data available only from agent reports.

In light of experience, evaluate relation of collateral sources and photos, SI; are they being best used to complement each other?))
Are collateral sources underused by top decision-makers? Should latter be wary of ~~examining~~ using other sources to invalidate totally the "smoke" shown by collateral sources?

Examine the total "noise" background of collateral sources.

Examine preconceptions which analysts, and decision-makers bring to evidence: not only gross ones (SU wouldn't do it)) but details of linkages (McC: If SA's come, can MRBM's be far behind?)

In Cuba, some Sov activities observed for first time ((likewise, US)): so: a) they couldn't be fully interpreted at the time; (b) in future, it will be possible to interpret them, thanks to Cuba.

((Same for US; question: impact of Cuba on ability to interpret each other's behavior, and to communicate if desired, in future crises. WHAT ALERTING/PREPARATORY PROCEDURES HAVE STILL NEVER BEEN OBSERVED, ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER? What surprises, confusions, might this create in future, intense crisis? Can these serve to define levels of intensity, as yet unobserved? What will serve to flag the unprecedented nature of a future crisis? Are top decision-makers aware of degrees of unprecedentedness of US actions they may contemplate? and of difficulties of interpretation, as well as of signal of intent?

Was US dispersal in Cuba the waste of a powerful signal (Bennington/Schelling); in what ways did use then condition impact of a similar act in future?

Sovs: tested possible Air Defense fight dispersal plan, beginning in May 62; crisis took place in fall, when Sov forces are at peak proficiency (for Berlin crisis?); may have restricted preparations to a minimum to ensure strategic surprise.

Sovs Sept 11 alert appeared to be a response to militant US announcements ((How was it interpreted by US decision-makers? As political play?))

In retrospect, appears to have been initiated as a response to the 7 Sept request by JFK for authority to fall up reserves because, unknown to US, this call-up coincided with the initial introduction of missiles into Cuba. In all probability, the call-up caused grave concern in the USSR about possible US knowledge of their 'missile venture'. This alert was reduced in late Sept or early Oct after the Sovs realized that their missile venture was continuing undetected by the US.

((But 5 Sept recon would not have disclosed missiles; they might have started arriving by 7 Sept (could they have by 2 Sept?), but Sovs knew no flights (might they have feared 5 Sept flight showed something? e.g., 29 Aug flight showed vehicles and construction material at IRBM sites))

15 Oct: standby alert, probably because of Sov realization that venture had been detected by 14 Oct flight

16 Oct: activation of Sov Far East weather reporting for North America for first time (?)

23 Oct Sat Forces placed on alert

What was purpose of Sov deception? Who were they trying to deceive? Note pattern of making tough, deceptive statement after having invalidating it, by action, private statement: ships would run blockade (to businessman, JFK on 24 Oct, after publicly known ships had turned away (though still question of remaining ships: only 2 dry cargo?); Tass-man statement on 23 Oct; 27 Oct letter;

Can they have hoped to deter recon? Or to convey message that they would not reveal missiles, if we didn't, before election?

What did members of ExComm make of Sov intent in statements? How did they react?

What is K theory of significance of US elections? Had he promised not to embarrass, on 23 Aug (to Sorenson?) Might he have thought we were hoping, above all, that he would not break news before election?

Dobrynin-Sorenson, Aug 23, Sept 6; Dobrynin-Bol Oct 1 (Oct 23); (Aug. 29?)

Dob-Bowles, Oct 13; Gromyko Oct 18.

Hills: S may have told F, 2 or 3 days.

Gore: 20 Oct: 2

V: if what you have right to do to Cuba, we have right to do to Turkey or Iran. (But Turkey and Iran are weak, no threat).

if balance is equal, equal rights.

We will not disturb balance; No, we will not commit ourselves not to expand, not to upset balance...

We had miscalculated, e.g. in Cuba. Interpretation: you made a mistake in Cuba.

Why secrecy of comm? Reluctant to make explicit ultimatum; embarrass K, make it hard to accept?

See Vienna,

McC's role fairly creditable. Honeymoon messages, late Aug --third week in Sept: took evidence of SRAs as confirming suspicions; as compared to analysts, gave more weight to possibility of irrational, radical, out-of-pattern move by K; and gave more weight to actual advantages of move to K. Criticized est. of Sept 19 ((often may give verbal dissent from est--verbal footnote--in giving it to Pres))

((Did analysts give too much weight to the "obvious" risks of move: not only judging perception of these risks by Sovs, without direct evidence, but judging "actual" risks--in effect, predicting decisions of US Pres. How well qualified is anybody now--and in particular, Sov experts or intelligence analysts in general--to make this prediction? How much was it based on general considerations, generalized circumstances, rather than on a variety of specific circumstances, or a predicted range of circumstances?))

((McC tendency to have great confidence in his intuitions; reluctant to change in face of analysts evidence or argument. Is Was he then also unfettered by knowledge or experience of weight of past evidence on K behavior?

Yet, how much evidence was there for analysts--Kent--implicit assumption that K's behavior was stable, rational, informed, predictable, prudent? Let alone, that this is fair assumption for most political leaders.))

Not nearly as much yet as it has to do. There are a lot of
one day or longer programs now. I am taking a longer flight
for the purpose of the patient. The program is still running.

Because of the II rating, we will continue to monitor the
of the program. We are going with no more in the future
or description in the future.

Temperature and program to ensure that the program is still
(month 3). Now, already additional notes, the program is
integrity of this since into the 70s.

and for CSE, again

after discussion on the top. It is now the of Advanced Manual Study in 1974.

KBM reliability: average number of minutes per day. That's right.
(~35/yr)

11

550 8.53 25 = 14,410

(1960) 599 17 (55)

50 8.53 13 = 10,900

(1961) 575

(1962) 15,500

1962 0

50 17 (1960)

18,500 70

(1961) 575

1962 0

14,500 (1961) 11.2

standing (1961)

15,500
16,952.3

High altitude in high GSP
low alt - low GSP
Multiple loading
ASMS

553 = 1.65 MT

15,500

24 72

46

23.6

41.5

11340

4543

13 56 169 24.3 512

20.1

131.7

16,879

195.5 5.6 6.5 5.6 5.7

22 Oct. Cover letter to K with speech. Refers to discussion at Vienna, Pres assertion there that US would not allow SU to take actions overturning present balance of power.

((Balance then conceived as "equal"? But now conceived as unequal, favoring US; we were, in effect, still proposing to prevent K from producing drastic change in balance of power, in direction of equality. Meanwhile, K had vigorously rejected this position at Vienna, refused to renounce efforts to change the balance of power in Russia's favor.))

had given specific example there of possible miscalculation of US determination: trying to destroy US rights of access to Berlin.

Do not mistake moderation of current action for lack of determination; we are determined that missiles shall be removed. I hope you will act prudently, have ships comply with quarantine.

K reply, 23 Oct: cover letter with public reply. You have no right to take action. Weapons of Cuba, whatever their character, are for defensive purposes. Cuba is small, cannot be a threat to giant US.

Reply (?) 23 (?) Oct: You started this, by putting missiles in Cuba
~~ExComm's decision with quarantine matter~~

F reply to quarantine: put yourself in my position; ultimatum; cannot comply; prize piratical; have ordered captains not to comply.

((But had ordered them to turn morning of 23 Oct, before OAS vote; they changed course about noon; Navy didn't report this to ExComm till 24 Oct; announced 25 Oct.))

reply, 25 (?) Oct: refers to Shipments in August, Pres statements. You made deceptive statements, in public and private, assuring that no offensive weapons were being sent. On the basis of this assurances, I ~~rx~~ publicly restrained those who wanted to take action. Then I learned that recently you had been installing missiles.

26 Oct letter at US Emb in Moscow at 1000, probably sent about 0930 Washington time; it didn't begin arriving till about 1800 (discussed at ExComm meeting at 2000).

F met with S about noon, Wash time; F called earlier (when?). Sou infers F offer sent earlier than letter, as it arrived; but times seem consistent with F offer being conceived at same time or later than letter, transmitted to F about same time or even after letter sent. Makes sense to me that F offer was a specification of vague "proposal" in letter ((which says only that if US would give guarantee...then situation would change, everything would be different; this would destroy need for technicians. Can't speak for C but he would no longer have need for mobilization. ~~I~~ I propose: you guarantee drop quarantine; we would (send no more arms?); then necessity for weapons you term offensive would disappear.)) Reply to ~~S~~ F might have signalled: in couple of days before US action (?); and, highly likely that this offer would be accepted if others failed; ~~unxxx~~

continued:

if this had failed, no use trying tougher one, in private let alone in public; 27 Oct letter--sent about 24 hours after 26 Oct letter, and after S reply to F (presumably, after receipt of F report in Moscow) may have been public probe, public in part because hope of generating public support for it (also, to speed delivery?)

((Sie: Rusk maintains emphatically that 27 Oct letter was a result of public suggestions by Lippman on 25 Oct and Kreisky (Lippman not available for reflection in Moscow in time for 26 Oct letter?))

(Note: US couldn't charge "bad faith" because even if they had been public, neither 26 Oct letter nor ~~2~~ F ~~2~~ "question" ~~2~~ could be described as a commitment to a definite offer. E.g., 26 Oct letter doesn't mention Turkey, but doesn't say that missiles would be removed, either. The "necessity" for them would disappear (not necessarily missiles)--~~xxxxxx~~ SU had denied necessity for them even before crisis, but had put them in anyway--but that could mean, they are then available for bargaining, e.g., against those equally "unnecessary" missiles in Turkey. The F offer, in contrast, was a specific trade, in which Turkey did not figure: but was purely hypothetical.

Acceptance of F offer did not bind K at all (or US); but it revealed acceptability of this to US, thus gave him strong basis for believing he could get at least this; in absence of this, he might not have felt free to spend time probing, in view of other signals.

Sou, Sie: tendency of ExComm officials to deprecate F-8 exchange in view of 26 Oct letter; but would that not have appeared quite ambiguous if the F offer were not available to make if specific? Note that our reply of 27 Oct is essentially to F offer, not to 26 Oct letter.

By sending F offer, K in effect got an immediate reply to his 26 Oct letter, read in a form favorable to US; in effect, he had US public reply of 27 Oct on the night of 26 Oct or early morning of 27 Oct: probably before sending 27 Oct letter. ((whereas public impression--and of how many members of ExComm, staff?)), he didn't get reply to either before he had sent both.

Big US decision of afternoon of 27 Oct was not to combine two letters but to ignore 27 Oct letter; meanwhile, threatening (as retaliation to Anderson, or to further shootdowns? Or, just as "retal" to failure to remove missiles? What was threatened, or implied? If Anderson stressed, this suggests action against SAMs; if missiles, missiles. What was feeling of ExComm about Anderson, and about implications of prior commitments about U-2s and political consequences of inaction. Was K "forcing our hand"? (See Sie account of Ball reaction)).

((

14 May

Hils: F-S exchange essential to interpretation of 26 May letter. The two were probably sent as a package ((K might guess: more likely to get answer to F offer earlier; and more likely to get good answer to letter if read in light of F offer.))

F was resident. (sure?)

Rusk told S to call F Saturday afternoon, wrote out message. S saw F at 1630, berated him in violent terms for Saturday morning message negating Friday night offer; said we never, never would consider Turkey deal in the slightest; said letter "means war." Said he spoke for himself, but hinted he reflected mood of higherups.

(F claimed at start, and later, that K had not had F message at time he wrote Saturday morning letter.)

S had dinner with F Sunday night; F said he had been instructed to tell S that his services were much appreciated, and had been very valuable. In particular, that applied to his "explosion" Saturday afternoon.

Hils feels: Rusk took S channel very seriously at time, spent much time and attention with it; definitely influenced interpretation, and was basis for Trollope ploy. (Says Excomm was jubilant at 1000 Saturday morning, till new letter came in). F offer was only offer of inspection ((till Saturday morning letter?)), and F-S exchange Saturday afternoon the only brutal, explosive exchange known to Hils to convey mood to K.

Hughes checked out Keating claim of Oct 10, at the time, that there six IRBM sites; int comm had no basis for this; no refugee reports mentioned six, or total number; there were two good reports about Oct 10--could have been around earlier--but they referred to storage sites at Remedios. Hils thinks Keating got this out of the air.

(But consider position it put administration in, with their flat statements on "I know there is no evidence on missiles...I think it extremely unlikely they would put missiles in.")

Sonnenfeldt, Bob Baraz, 16 April.

Sonn. told morning of 16th by Hilsman.

On Scali: Sonn had gone home Friday evening; was called back by Hilsman about 9:15, told about Scali and about K letter. Spent all night working on paper analysing the two developments, comparing them, to be presented by Hilsman to ExComm the next morning. ((Was Sorenson working on reply that night? Did ExComm have a draft to consider when it met at 10?))

Scali ~~xxx~~ came to Hilsman; they were with Rusk, about 6, when K letter began to come in; it came last section first (the "business end") and came in to them all, discussed in front of Scali. It seemed to confirm Scali story, which was more precise: called for UN supervision and inspection, offered to withdraw. Scali sworn in, "cleared," discussed answer.

Thus, while letter alone might have been more ambiguous, Fomin offer had considerable impact on its interpretation. In considering a draft reply, they were in effect taking the details from the Fomin offer. Later, when Saturday letter came in, the final reply could be interpreted as taking the details--the specific offer to withdraw and the terms of inspection--from the Fomin offer (or the Saturday letter), rather than from the Friday night letter (which didn't have them), while ignoring the Turkey deal.

((Sonn admits they may overemphasize the Fomin-Scali episode, because of being in on it and close to it. Sieverts says other members tend to deprecate it, say it was the word from K himself that was regarded as important (but couldn't Fomin have influenced interpretation of that?) and "We didn't have any need ~~xx~~ for informal contacts, outsiders; we had plenty of contact, e.g., Tommy" (but might not Sovs have preferred approach through Scali, to whom they had no responsibilities, could disown?)) (Note that Tommy prefers to believe that Dobrynin didn't know the story--which is probably true, but also convenient, allowing Tommy to continue his relationship with him).

ExComm was undoubtedly very relieved Friday night, early Saturday morning; thought it was over. (Could they really relinquish this mood, of having won "peacefully" through threats rather than attack, by Saturday or Sunday--give up hope of settlement and turn to choice of attack?)

Rostow probably didn't know Saturday morning of Friday night letter (or Scali); Tyler and his deputy didn't.

((Rostow operation generally a backwater; Sonn: It would have made more sense to have that operation after the crisis--rather than tie up as many good people as it did. Consider analogy to the crisis operations at K4D. Did they have any impact, on anyone? Did they have enough information, were they enough in touch?))

Next day, Scali gave Fomin hell about Turkey letter: what's going on, you never said anything about Turkey. Fomin seemed embarrassed.

There were further Scali-Fomin contacts.

3. Baraz' paper of 12-19 Oct exemplified earlier Hilsman thesis that intell. should ~~consequently~~ consider consequences of U.S. actions; but also, role that this puts Iak into of imagining and quasi-evaluating U.S. policies. While still regarding their missiles as unlikely, he was asking: "But suppose they did put them in, What might we do, and what would the likely responses be to these actions, by SU, Cubans, allies, neutrals? "

(("How could the Sovs have achieved a fait accompli? How could they have prevented a US crisis--by convincing us that 'There was nothing to be done,' too late, no challenge to action, no opportunity to avert undesired change in the status quo. How could they have delayed our discovery; stayed our hand; increased risks to us of action, reduced incentives?

"How could they have triggered a US ~~x~~ direct attack on missiles? Did they know what it took? Might they have done it? "

Baraz:

If Sovs had earlier put MRBMs into a satellite: that would have made it look less unlikely that he would put them into Cuba; yet, it would still look like a "first" for him, a switch: It would still be outside the Warsaw Pact, a country without an alliance, not really, yet, fully within the bloc, at such a long distance, with an unreliable leader.

((Were the peculiar advantages of putting missiles into Cuba, as opposed to other locations, taken fully into account? The various incentives so clear now to Southard? And how reliable were these former patterns held to be; how reliable, on past experience, was the very notion that "K doesn't break from his patterns"?))

One aspect of Hilsman--IER line on including Castro in threats was: K's reaction when confronted with an indirect challenge was much more predictable; his reaction if confronted with a direct ultimatum much less so.

2. Sonnenfeldt

Night of 21-22 Sept, Hilsman tried to persuade Mike Forrestal to include Castro in denunciation in speech. Sonn wrote memo about 2-3 in the morning. But "speech was already written."

Sieverts: this was Hilsman's hobby horse. He had pushed, then and later, on notions that: a) this would broaden options, lay groundwork for later actions to get rid of Castro (which IGR thought should be pushed); b) this would give Khrushchev an opportunity to shove blame onto Castro and abandon him, along with missiles.

Sonn: as it worked out, it was a greater defeat for Khrushchev, so probably just as well. Baraz: probably wouldn't have made much difference.

((But why was notion dropped of including Castro, or even of focussing on him? Sieverts: Intelligence was determining--it indicated more and more clearly that this was purely a Russian undertaking, operation. But that didn't mean a) Castro hadn't invited it; b) we shouldn't seize opportunity to blame Castro. Who/why/when was opposition to this?))

(note: Carter was acting DCI while McC away)

General belief in intell. commun that SU wouldn't put missiles; SNIE except for McC in CIA ((when did he start? prior to SAMS?)) and a group with Nigro (?) in DIA; because it was so uncharacteristic.

Baraz: combination of feelings that it was "too different" and "too risky" for Sovs; he knew of no individual who held one view without the other (e.g., "it's not the sort of stupid, reckless thing they usually do").

(Did this reflect feeling that (a) if US did take local action beyond blockade, SU would be in bad spot? and (b) they would have to give some attention to that? But maybe (Southard, Munson) they gave very little prob to that; or (Sonn) they regarded that as possible but "less likely," and as ~~xxx~~ with some other bureaucracies, contingency of less likelihood got virtually no attention.))

Various reasons for not expecting: for surprise:

- 1) "It's too different."
- 2) "It's too dangerous."
- 3) "It's too mean." (Thompson; JFK? Rusk? Growing hopes or understanding; "dialog" with Gromyko in New York on non-dissemination, Berlin, test ban; hopeful. ((So, pressures for action may have been seen as jeopardizing that dialog; as would a U-2 incident?))

Note feeling on 28 Oct, virtually unanimous in State and WH: there must be no gloating, don't rub it in, hurt K's position; and (b) now that K has looked close at nuclear war, there is a chance for real progress: he will never try such a thing again. The belief that he has learned make it unnecessary for us to learn, i.e., to modify the expectations that made his act a surprise for us.



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DJSM-633-64
11 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: SIOP Access

Reference: Office of the Secretary of Defense Memo
I-5160/64, dated 3 April 1964

In response to the referenced memorandum, Mr.
John T. McNaughton and Mr. Daniel Ellsberg have been
placed on the Master SIOP Access List at the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Code 1 (complete) SIOP
access.

J. W. Davis
J. W. DAVIS
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

April 24, 1962
1962 Cuba Quarantine Criticized and Defended at Law
Barley

by ANTHONY LEWIS
Special to the New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 23 -- Last fall's quarantine of Cuba was praised and denounced today at a meeting of the American Society of International Law.

Prof. Quincy Wright of Columbia University was the principal critic. He said President Kennedy's move to force removal of Soviet missiles had been "an illegal and dangerous unilateral action."

"By the quarantine," Professor Wright said, "the United States resorted to forcible action that cannot be justified with our obligations under the United Nations Charter. You cannot reconcile the position we took with the obligation to settle all disputes by peaceful means."

Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, said the quarantine was not a "legal issue" at all in the way that phrase should be understood.

Issue Held 'Above Law'

"In our system," he said, "the survival of states is above law--it must be."

Mr. Acheson suggested that no lawyer could really have said, in October, whether the quarantine was "legal" or "illegal." The law, he said, simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power--power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty.

As a historical example he mentioned the refusal of the Court of King's Bench in the 14th Century to pass on the validity of the Duke of York's claim to the English Crown. The question was too much one of power, not of principle.

"It is harmful to believe," Mr. Acheson said, "that nations have accepted restraints on their sovereign power that prevent them from saving a way of life that respects law."

"I cannot believe that there are principles of law that may we must accept destruction of our way of life--I just cannot believe it."

Mr. Acheson said international law did play a part in the Cuban quarantine strategy and development --the important procedural role that law often plays.

Legal considerations were involved in the steps for approval of the quarantine by the Organization of American States. Legal avenues, Mr. Acheson said, permitted wise delay and consideration of the views of other governments.

Abram J. Chayes, legal adviser of the State Department, said "law was an important consideration" in the quarantine decision. The long-run goals of the United States, he said, would have been damaged by a cynical disregard for law.

Mr. Chayes asserted that the quarantine was sustainable under established principles of international law. He relied primarily, as Governments of officials have in comments since the episode, on the authorization of the O.A.S.

However, Mr. Chayes, like Mr. Acheson, declared that it was foolish to ask such questions as, "Was the quarantine legal?" He said the first year of law school was supposed to teach lawyers not to ask generalized questions like that.

In domestic law, Mr. Chayes said, the whole effect of the judicial system is to refine and focus questions and get away from such abstractions. Since international law has no effective judicial remedies in most cases, he continued, it is up to international lawyers to do the refining and focusing--not "to deal at large with such deep policy questions."

Professor Wright accepted Mr. Chayes' contention that the vote of the Organization of American States authorized action against Cuba herself, since Cuba was a signatory to the O.A.S. treaty. But he said it was not a basis for action against ships of a third party, the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chayon contended that this approach produced the absurd result that it would be "illegal" to block Soviet ships en route to Cuba but "legal" to bomb anything in Cuba, or her territorial waters, including Soviet ships.

The U-2 and the Cuban Crisis

collateral

1. Negative evidence on ~~agent~~ reports (spring 1962).
 2. Negative on ~~existing~~ missile reports, 5 Aug. (and on buildup?)
 3. Positive on SAMs, negative on MRBMs, 29 Aug and 4 Sept.
 4. Alleged: McN, JFK relied heavily on photos, little on reports ("not evidence").
 5. 30 Aug ~~and~~; U-2 overflight of Sakhalin; Sept 8, U-2 shot down over China; 2 31 Aug, 7 Sept evidence of SAMs, no evidence of MRBMs---planned flight Sept 10 cancelled (why?): meeting of Sept 10.
- a) sensitivity to incidents; b) little prob of MRBMs: 1) no evidence (assumption that they couldn't appear soon?), plus evidence of SAMs with which to discount agent reports; 3) expert disbelief (ONE, except for McC);
4) political disbelief (especially, wishfully, after we had announced?)
c) appearance of SAMs (especially in area where reports indicated possible site).

This led to desire

Komur, 27 March 61

On communication between Allies:

On Cyprus, our interests were not identical with British. But we had a good plan; which was held up for 10(?) days because we had failed to communicate with British, "educate" them (to a degree that was possible despite some difference in interest). Simply didn't get around to it? (British wouldn't accept, or had plan of their own?)

1964

630 x 11

6930

80 x 13

1040

7970

(148 2.1)

MM 600 x 1.15

690

180 x 1.15

207

26 x 4.5

117

108 x 9

972

10,397

2427

1000 x 1.1 =

1100

656 x 1.4 =

918.4

1756

10,397

1756.0

10397

3

79.5%

1972

1964

272.6 / 11340

4275 / 13050

144 / 1224

2127 / 11

2185 / 4343

2443 / 2714

[Handwritten scribbles]

7.1.1964

6.3

2171/289-1372-12/5112

256

1961

1962

1963

398/337

475/980

2972/6156

207/2937

317/354

557/630

557/336

1. 5542/20882
(251742)

5172/10763

8thab 63

64

5238/14515

5715/15769

(x 9275/13000)
min 1443/2771

1964

65

5572/14458

5357/13777

10770/2376

1985

67

1541/2051

5536/11972

5011/11253

8192/433575

(3451/8890)
(2135/3081)

(20206/11340)
225/4443

Notes projected 25% each from
1961 to 1963 (actual about 40%)

19

(Note: 1961-1963, but not 1964)

B-52 approved + TEG

JCS

73

630

B-47 (200 L 65, and in 66)

SS approved + TEG

10

66

62

AMSA CSAF

71
15

105

RTAs JCS

TIG

72

(down from 125 in 67)

0 (only in 68)

Station

TEG

54

(down from 128 L 64 to 54 L 65)

MM I approved

JCS

TEG

72
400

73

100

?

MM I approved
CSAF

300
1500

1500

1000

?

2000
1000
1000
1000
1000

13 00-01 1X 17 Jan 1962 The threat to US security interests in the Caribbean Area

(over the next two decades).

Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved.

The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war.

((Note U-2 shootdown of 27 Oct!)) Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous revolution and as a base for subversive operations.

((No mention of goals in Europe that might seem urgent, might be served by missiles--not just base--in Cuba.))

Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. ((Fishing port!)) For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes.

This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. ((two decades)) If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of a US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection.

It is notable that Bloc military deliveries to Cuba to date have been such as to enhance Cuba's capabilities for defense against external attack and for the maintenance of internal security rather than to contribute to the development of an independent offensive military capability. The Bloc has provided no strategic weapon systems. Although the Cuban army has been made formidable by Carib. standards, Cuba lacks the air and naval capabilities required for major overseas military operations, even at Carib. distances. The bomber force is still limited to a few inherited B-26's.

These Bloc military deliveries have been responsive to the most urgent requirements of the Castro regime, but they probably also reflect a deliberate Bloc policy. In keeping with its demonstrated concern to avoid any commitment to come to the defense of Cuba with its own forces, the USSR presumably desires to avoid the possible Sov involvement inherent in providing Cuba with independent means for taking major military action against its neighbors.

On these grounds, we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with air, missile, or naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas, or that it will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. It would also not preclude the provision of a token number of Il-26 jet light bombers. Special Sov comm and intell. facilities will probably be established in Cuba.

((So: from past behavior, Sov intentions and motives are deduced, and from these, future behavior predicted; the bet is against change in behavior. (But what precludes change in motives, goal?)

Note early origin of offensive-defensive distinction, precise lines drawn in Sept 13 statement (except for Il-26s); prediction of everything except: a) SU combat units, large personnel base; b) large number of Il-26s; c) MRBM-IRBMs.

(Had estimate changed at all as of 1 Aug? 19 Sept? Were any "surprises" noted at all by then?)

If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal threat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba.

((Is there a hint of following methodology: 1) Deduce past SU goals from past action; 2) extrapolate future actions on assumption that goals are constant?))

moscow for irco, 3 Sept 62

On the basis of existing intelligence the Sov military deliveries to Cuba do not constitute a substantial threat to US security. They do constitute a deterrent to certain types of surveillance... They also constitute evidence that Moscow, having been frustrated in certain directions, is in a mood to double its bet rather than cut its losses, at least on a selective basis. In this case, Moscow has moved strongly but defensively to meet Castro's anxieties about overflights and other intrusions, and to shore up his flagrantly weak economy.

These deliveries constitute, further:

1. A psychological move of some power in the Caribbean and in the rest of Latin America...
2. A psychological move likely to heighten US domestic anxiety with respect to Cuba.
3. A testing thrust by Moscow, which, at considerable financial cost and further commitment of prestige, places before us the question of where and how we should draw the line with respect to unacceptable action and behavior by the Communists in Cuba and the hemisphere.

We face, therefore, a problem of both formulating a reaction and articulating it in ways designed to: diminish the political costs under 1 and 2, above; minimize the likelihood of any further extension of Cuban capabilities or Soviet capabilities or Soviet capabilities in Cuba; and provide the legal and policy basis, under certain contingent circumstances, for the liquidation of communism in Cuba by force.

A. Drawing the line. The ambiguities in the public mind, here and abroad, about the military meaning of the Soviet deliveries require not merely that we explain what they are and why-- up to a point-- we are prepared to regard them as acceptable, but that we also clarify the kinds of installations and capabilities emplaced in Cuba which we would regard as unacceptable. The President must consider going beyond his statement of April 20, 1961: "I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our nation!" These deliveries, rightly or wrongly, raise the question in the public mind of the security of the nation; and it may, therefore, be appropriate to indicate what we would not be prepared to accept without direct military riposte. In general, that line should be drawn at the installation in Cuba or in Cuban waters of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles, sea or land based. There may be other types of aggressive instruments that we would wish to include in this definition. In addition, this may be an appropriate occasion to underline our willingness to act with others in the Hemisphere against Cuba should Castro undertake direct or indirect aggression against other Latin American nations.

2.

The Comm position will, undoubtedly, be that we have established on the Eurasian land mass military installations proximate to their borders, including nuclear delivery capabilities. Our reply must be and can be that by regional security action, provided for under the Charter of the UN, this Hemisphere operates under a different set of rules than the Eurasian land mass. In this context, it should be noted that we would be playing directly into Moscow's hands to use the occasion of pressure on us in Cuba to withdraw THOMs from Turkey. ((Who brought t is up?)) There is no clear stopping place for Communist activities based in Cuba unless we hold fast to the special status in Hemispheric law and agreement of "extra-continental" intervention.

...Our NATO allies must come to understand that we are not prepared to accept symmetry between the Allied position on the Eurasian land mass and the Communist presence in this Hemisphere; and that a condition for understanding with Washington is their recognition of the seriousness of this matter to us.

((Asked by Pres to review Cuba over the weekend, after having been out of it. Pres read; no feedback, however. Basis for Sept 4 statement?

Any planning on ~~extra~~ possible actions if they did put in nuclears? see NSAM 181. R mentions blockade, invasion, air strike; adds possibility of commando raid to destroy installations. discusses covert actions.

Was commitment mainly a chance to say something about why we were accepting what was there, in the context of saying something bold (about what we would do in other circumstances), thus allaying criticism of our acceptance as being weakness; (note parallel to planning something bold, while accepting current opposing actions); did Moscow interpret it this way? Is this the way, in fact, commitments get made? (e.g., British commitment to Poland) Similar to acceptance of a fait accompli: we will act very bravely and swiftly, next time ("We are bold, despite current inaction: witness our bold staking of prestige and planning for action.")

(R's interpretation of Moscow's readiness to double its bets reflects his paper of a week earlier on K's incentives to gamble. His view was that a sense of weakness and failure was a motive to K to take a gamble with a high risk (R thinks K thought odds were no better than 50-50; I suspect, much better) of considerable prestige failure--though not of military loss, since he would withdraw. Hence, R not surprised when missiles appeared; and R's expectation was that he would withdraw them if confronted with a high risk of military action, without need for any concessions by us. R fought strongly against deal, on Wednesday--Saturday; representing J, Tyler, Owen, along with Nitze and Rusk, vs 10, McG, (Ball?), (JFK?). R not surprised when K withdrew on Sunday; doesn't know expectations just prior to that of ExComm.

R did know of Friday night letter Friday night (consider Saturday morning meeting!). Was working on "surgical" air plan; (thinks McN countered JCS 1500-sortie proposal with proposal for 6).
Thinks Pres would have hit

GWB recommendation to Pres

I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strike are too great for us to undertake it. I have, therefore, concluded that the blockade plan--while by no means wholly satisfactory--is the course we should follow.

...begin with assumption that the Sov nuc build-up in Cuba does not add appreciably to the Sov ability to impose destruction on the US...

If this assumption be valid--and I have heard no compelling arguments against it--then the menace we face is not the addition of new Sov military capabilities so much as their moral and propaganda advantage. As I understand it, the proponents of the strike plan insist that what we are facing is a test of will that will be witnessed by all the world. Unless the US is prepared to use decisive military power, the world will lose confidence in our strength and determination.

But I think that--far from establishing our moral strength--we would, in fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our traditions

drafts: 3

USC First draft, 20 Oct

(Sept 11, Gromyko statements). The USA need not and cannot tolerate defiance, deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.

(Final: Neither the US nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small.) (Suez?)

We no longer live in a world where only an actual "armed attack" as Article 51 of the UN Charter originally intended the phrase, represents a challenge to a nation's security.

(We no longer...where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.)

Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantial increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in the nature of their threat, may well require an act of self-defense.

(...or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.)

.....
Nevertheless American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, our danger has not been greatly increased. ((in pencil: ~~has~~ not been altered in kind but has been substantially increased.))

(Final: In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger ((third draft, 21 Oct: simply add)) --although it should be noted that the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.)

Blockade: And let me make it clear that it will not only prevent completion of the current offensive build-up. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the American Navy in American waters, or abandoning its obligations to Mr. Castro. It will also have, in a comparatively short time, a profound effect on the military, economic and political underpinnings of the Castro regime; and it will be continued until all missiles and offensive bases are gone from that island.

(Final: deleted.)

first draft: 2

I have directed our military forces...
Secondly, (close surveillance); ; to take
further military action if that build-up continues, threatens
and so requires;

((final: Should these offensive military preparations
continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere,
further action will be justified. I have directed the
Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust
that in the interests of both the Cuban people and the
Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned
of continuing this threat will be recognized.))

...to include these air and missile bases on the targeting system
of our strategic and retaliatory forces; and finally, to
regard any missile launched from Cuba as an attack by the SU
requiring a massive retaliatory response upon the SU.

((final: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard
any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation
in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the SU upon
the US, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the SU.))

(contrast McN backgrounder, Oct 22. Controversy, reasons,
on this wording?)

...
I am asking Soviet Chairman Khrushchev, who will shortly be
coming to the UN meeting in New York, to meet with me at the
earliest opportunity with respect to this provocative threat to
world peace and the relations between our two countries.

((I call upon Chairman K to halt and eliminate this clan-
destine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace
and to stable relations between our two nations.))

...But we will not negotiate with a gun at our heads--a gun
that imperils innocent Cubans as well as Americans. Our byword
is: "Negotiation yes, intimidation no!" That is why this threat--
or any other threat which is made independently or in response
to our blockade--must and will be met with determination; and
therefore, while any talks go on, our forces all over the world
will be alert--and the blockade will remain.

(; But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these
problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why...
made independently or in response to our actions this week--
(last part deleted).))

One path we shall never choose--the path of ~~submission~~ surrender
or submission. I tell you, therefore, that these missiles now
in Cuba will someday go--and no others will take their place.

((last sentence deleted))

drafts: 3

Original deprecates ~~threat~~ ~~emphasizes~~ military significance, emphasizes "defiance," deception. Final stresses increased threat, provocative change, clandestine move, threat to Latin America.

First amounts to justifying preventive or preemptive attack.

Initial emphasizes blockade as answer; only provisionally mentions possibility of further military action; says missiles will go someday.

Final emphasizes possibility of further military if preparations continue; implies action this week; does not emphasize blockade as answer to buildup.

Initial suggests summit conf, negotiation as answer to continued buildup; final does not.

Initial merely quotes Sept 11 and Gromyko; third draft calls Sept 11 statement "patently false and misleading," calls Gromyko statements "dishonest and dishonorable."

Final: calls both false.

Oct 20: Political program to be announced by the President

1. Recent developments with respect to offensive capability in Cuba constitute the gravest threat to the peace and security of the Caribbean area as well as to the world. Thus the can and should be discussed by the Security Council and measures should be taken to avert any immediate danger and to find, through negotiation, permanent solution to the problem.
2. Ambassador Stevenson will propose to the Security Council tomorrow (?) (sic) a resolution whereby the UN would dispatch immediately observation teams to all strategic nuclear missile sites maintained on the territory of any country other than the three major nuclear powers. These observation teams, which would be placed in Cuba, Italy, and Turkey, would insure that no surprise attack could be mounted in any of these countries pending a permanent solution to the problem of foreign missile bases.
3. If the SU justifies these missile bases in Cuba as necessary to guarantee that country against foreign invasion, I reply that there is, in fact, no such threat to Cuba. But the US would agree, along with the other American states, to guarantee the territorial integrity of Cuba, and we propose the organization and immediate dispatch of a UN force to Cuba, modeled on the UN Emergency Force, to effectuate this guarantee. But to insure the security of the hemisphere we must insist on the prompt dismantling of these missile sites in Cuba and the withdrawal of all Soviet military personnel. Concurrently the US will evacuate our base at Guantanamo and withdraw all forces and weapons therefrom.

Because of the danger of escalation the SU's clandestine action in Cuba has endangered the whole world and demands that we all hasten the conclusion of nuclear and general disarmament before it is too late. We can draw no better lesson from this experience. And the US stands ready to consider with the Soviet Union the elimination of the NATO strategic bases situated in Italy and Turkey and all other bases on the soil of countries other than the nuclear powers in the context of the disarmament treaties now under consideration.

(another version, 20 Oct: 4. We would be prepared to implement the phased withdrawal of all American forces from Guantanamo in company with the phased withdrawal of all Sov military personnel from Cuban installations and the dismantling of the missile sites.

5. In the present state of missile technology, with its long-range capability, foreign bases add little if anything to either Soviet or American missile potential. For this reason the US would be ~~xxxxxx~~ prepared to enter into ~~gn~~ negotiations with the SU looking towards the elimination of all strategic missile bases maintained on foreign soil. We would be willing to negotiate this matter either in the context of the disarmament discussions presently going forward, or independently. Note: 4 and 5 can be used alternatively or cumulatively.

((Compare to: a) US initiative on Turkey considered preceding week to sorten effect of US surprise attack on missiles; b) Defangin resolution of next week.

Stev. memo concerning Security Council presentation:

9. Whether or not the SC or GA may have acted on our resolution, no UN presence can be established in Cuba without Soviet consent, which will probably not be forthcoming before a Summit meeting. Hence we must assume that the base build-up may continue pending a broad political settlement reached at the Summit. A full political program (UN observers, territorial integrity of Cuba, and evacuation of foreign bases) proposed now might well attract so much general support that the Soviets would stop further build-up pending the Summit and make an air strike unnecessary.